Imagine that you're a judge deciding a case brought by a federal prisoner. The prisoner complains that, while he was being transferred from one prison to another, the prison system lost some of his property. He claims $177 as the value of the lost property.
Seems reasonable enough, and, fortunately, Congress, over 60 years ago, passed the Federal Tort Claims Act to make the United States as liable as any private party for torts such as losing someone's property.
But wait! The government (probably spending $50,000 to avoid paying this $177) points out that an exception to the FTCA provides that the United States is not liable for:
"Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer."
Here's the key question: does this statute have anything to do with the case?
If you said, "Gee, this exception seems to be all about customs and excise matters. It doesn't seem to have anything to do with property getting lost in the Bureau of Prisons. It's hard to imagine that Congress would write a statute covering the Bureau of Prisons in this roundabout way," give yourself four points out of a possible nine.
If you said, "The exception covers 'any claim arising in respect of . . . the detention of any . . . property by . . . any other law enforcement officer,' so the clear text of the statute covers the case and that's the end of the matter," you get five points and win.
Once again, our illustrious Supreme Court gets itself so caught up in parsing text finely that it loses sight of what interpretation is all about.
I don't want to be unfair to the Justices. If you look at the full opinion, you'll see that they gave this one a pretty good try -- recognizing that there were some arguments cutting in the prisoner's favor. And, again, to be fair, there is one more thing I haven't mentioned that makes this a tough case: the statute includes an exception to the exception (passed much more recently) that seems broader in scope.
But the critical point, best expressed in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, is that "Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes." If Congress meant to cover all losses of property by any government law enforcement officer doing anything, that's a pretty big category -- probably bigger by far than the category of officers engaging in customs and excise tasks. It's just not plausible to think that Congress would express its desire in a way that's so focused on customs and excise. The tail would be wagging the dog.
This is not the easiest case. The language does permit the Court's broad interpretation. I'm not saying it's a slam dunk the other way. But the Court should give more consideration to which is the better interpretation, and which interpretation better comports with the evident function that the statute is supposed to play.
In the meantime, hang on to your property when the feds come around. Apparently, if some FBI officer takes a liking to your laptop, there's nothing you can do about it.